Cross-chain collateral
was the missing piece.

PRISM is built for real-world credit — businesses, invoice financiers, capital allocators who do not hold their wealth in USDC. They hold it in BTC. In ETH. In assets that predate Solana entirely.

To underwrite credit against those assets, you need a way to lock them. Every path that existed before IKA ran through a centralized intermediary.

• Custodial bridges require trusting a single operator.
• Over $2B in bridge exploits since 2021.
• Wrapped assets are liabilities of whoever controls the mint.
• No existing path for trustless BTC or ETH collateral on Solana.

Custodial bridges do not solve the collateral problem. They move it — from an asset risk to a counterparty risk. A borrower who wraps BTC through a custodied bridge has not secured their collateral. They have loaned it.

IKA Network is a threshold Multi-Party Computation (MPC) network built on Sui. It enables a new primitive: dWallets. A dWallet is a cross-chain wallet whose private key is never assembled in one place.

Instead of a single keyholder, the key is split across a decentralized node network using cryptographic secret sharing. Signing requires a threshold of nodes to cooperate — each contributes a key fragment, and the final signature emerges from their collective computation.

• The key is never held by any single node or party.
• A threshold consensus is required to produce any signature.
• No one — not even IKA — can move funds unilaterally.
• Built on Sui with cryptographic guarantees, not policy promises.

This is not a multi-sig. Multi-sig requires multiple keys that each exist independently. Threshold MPC means the key itself never exists as a whole — it is only ever expressed as a collective output. The cryptographic guarantees are stronger, the attack surface is smaller.

PRISM's collateral onboarding flow is four steps. Each step is cryptographically verifiable. No step requires trusting a human.

The result: the Solana program has verified — without any off-chain trust assumption — that a borrower controls a specific quantity of BTC or ETH on its native chain. That verification is the basis for credit.

IKA's oracle network produces an attestation when a dWallet's collateral balance crosses a threshold. This attestation encodes the dWallet ID, asset type, amount, and timestamp into a fixed 81-byte message, signed by the oracle set using Ed25519.

Solana's Ed25519 precompile lets any program verify an Ed25519 signature as a native instruction. PRISM uses this directly: the first instruction in the collateral verification transaction runs the precompile check, and the second instruction — verify_ika_collateral — reads the precompile's result through the instructions sysvar.

The message layout in ika.ts is byte-identical to what the Rust program expects. Any mismatch fails the instruction. There is no oracle trust assumption beyond IKA's network itself — the cryptographic proof does the work.

The difference between PRISM with and without IKA is the difference between a niche protocol and a general-purpose credit market.

The addressable market for PRISM is not constrained to Solana-native capital. It is every holder of BTC and ETH who has ever needed credit and found no trustless path to access it.

Threshold MPC is easy to describe as a security feature. But for PRISM, it is closer to what TCP/IP is for the internet: an infrastructure layer without which the application layer cannot exist.

PRISM's credit market requires verifiable collateral. Verifiable collateral requires a way to lock assets without trusting any single party. Trusting any single party reintroduces counterparty risk — which is precisely what on-chain credit was supposed to eliminate.

IKA's dWallets close that loop. The chain of trust from collateral to credit to loan disbursement is now end-to-end cryptographic. Not policy-based. Not custodian-based. Provable.

That is what makes PRISM's credit market genuinely different — and why IKA was never optional. It was the prerequisite.